Barbosa et al. Reply to ``Comment on 'Secure Communication using
  mesoscopic coherent states', Barbosa et al, Phys Rev Lett 90, 227901", Yuan
  and Shields, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 048901(2005) by Yuen, Horace et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
05
02
06
1v
1 
 1
0 
Fe
b 
20
05
1
Barbosa et al. Reply to “Comment on ’Se-
cure Communication using mesoscopic coherent
states’, Barbosa et al, Phys Rev Lett 90, 227901”,
Z.L. Yuan, A.J. Shields, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94,
048901(2005)
The authors of Ref. [1] claim that the αη protocol [2]
is entirely equivalent to a classical stream cipher utiliz-
ing no quantum phenomena, a common misconception.
Indeed, a paper has already appeared in Phys. Lett. A
[3] to a similar effect, and we have responded [4]. Still,
we welcome the opportunity to clarify the situation for a
wider audience.
Before proceeding, we need to point out a terminologi-
cal shortcoming in Ref. [1] that further confuses the issue.
The term one-time pad is consistently used in Ref. [1] to
mean a conventional (classical) cipher with a shared se-
cret key, and should always be interpreted as such in
reading Ref [1]. Furthermore, one cannot state that such
a classical cipher with a shared secret key is “not secure”,
as security needs to be quantified. The main points of
Ref. [1] are that a) the security of αη is “unrelated to
quantum noise” for direct encryption, and b) αη cannot
be used to “expand the secret information they share”
for key generation.
Our response, in sum, is that there is a distinction be-
tween what has been achieved in our experiments and
what is in principle possible with the αη protocol. It is
true that our experiments, thus far, have not operated
in a regime which allows key generation and we have not
claimed that they have; but in principle key generation
is possible as already indicated in Ref. [2], a crucial point
missed in [1]. For direct encryption our experiments do
utilize quantum noise in an essential way that could be
done classically in principle, though not in practice. In
principle, αη may perform far beyond a conventional ci-
pher, especially with added techniques and lower signal
energy. These are described in some detail in Ref. [5] and
briefly discussed in Ref. [4].
The mistake in claiming that αη cannot generate new
key derives from ignoring the optimal quantum receiver
performance between Eve who does not know the key
K when she makes her quantum measurement, and Bob
who does. It follows from quantum detection theory [6]
that the bit-error rates in discriminating an antipodal sig-
nal set with the optimum quantum-receiver, an optimum
quantum phase-measurement, and balanced heterodyne-
detection are
P opte ∼ e
−4S , P phe ∼ e
−2S, P hete ∼ e
−S , (1)
respectively, where S is the signal photon number. Note
that while the transmitted signal set is M-ry, use of the
secret key collapses the signal set to binary antipodal
[2]. Further note that the optimum quantum-receiver
performance can only be achieved if the secret key is used
during measurement; something only Bob can do. This is
a quantum effect with no classical analog, and represents
a key generation principle fundamentally different from
the well known BB84 and Ekert protocols.
For bounding Eve’s performance, we may grant her a
full copy of the quantum signal and allow her to per-
form any quantum measurement. We have shown nu-
merically that Eve’s optimum quantum receiver’s perfor-
mance approaches that of the optimal quantum phase-
measurement – still a factor of two in the exponent worse
than Bob’s optimum receiver. As an example with a
mesoscopic signal level S ∼ 7, one has P opte ∼ 10
−12,
P phe ∼ 10
−6, and P hete ∼ 10
−3. At a 1 Gbps data rate,
Alice/Bob are likely to generate ∼ 103 or ∼ 106 new key
bits per second (with privacy amplification) depending
on Eve’s exact measurement. Note that while Eqn. 1
also applies for large S, the resulting key generation rate
would be extremely low.
For direct encryption, the coherent-state quantum
noise is used in the experiments of Ref. [2] to provide
high speed randomization that can in principle, but not
now in practice, be done classically. This randomization
is what distinguishes αη from a conventional cipher.
Moreover, with the additional mechanisms like deliber-
ate state-randomization, as described briefly in Ref. [5],
information-theoretic security against known-plaintext
attacks may be obtained – something that has yet to be
shown for any conventional cipher. Addressing another
criticism in Ref. [1], using many bits of the running key
does not reduce the efficiency of the seed key K. The
efficiency and security of conventional and quantum
cryptographic systems are much more subtle issues than
the treatment available in the literature may suggest.
Some detailed discussions of these issues, particularly
those related to αη, are given in Ref. [5].
Horace Yuen, Eric Corndorf, Geraldo Barbosa, and Prem
Kumar
Center for Photonic Communication and Computing
Northwestern University
2145 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208
yuen@ece.northwestern.edu
[1] Z. Yuan and A. Shields, Physics Review Letters 94, 048901
(2005).
[2] G. Barbosa, E. Corndorf, P. Kumar, and H. Yuen, Physics
Review Letters 90, 227901 (2003).
[3] T. Nishioka, T. Hasegawa, H. Ishizuka, K. Imafuku, and
H. Imai, Physics Letters A 327, 28 (2004).
[4] H. Yuen, P. Kumar, and E. Corndorf, R. Nair, quant-
ph/0407067, submitted to Phy. Lett. A (2004).
[5] H. Yuen, quant-ph/0311061 (2004).
[6] C. Helstrom, Quantum Detection and Estimation Theory
(Academic, New York, 1976).
